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Comment on Presidential Address 
 
Doing the Right Thing? Toward a Postmodern 
Politics 
 
 
Allan C. Hutchinson 
 
 
 
 
"We have learned the answers, all the answers: It is 
the question that we do not know." 
-Archibald MacLeish  ( 1928) 
 
 
 
 
el Handler would have had big problems with Spike Lee's Do the 
Right Thing. It is an auteurial tour-de-force by way of a postmodern 
fable for the ages that is self-consciously perplexing and inconclusive. 
While focusing on the competing imperatives of the pacificism of 
Martin Luther King's assimilationist politics and the violence of 
Malcolm X's cultural nationalism, Lee poses the more general and 
debilitating dilemma that faces those committed to decisive action 
in an opaque world. In a pivotal scene, the flip and up-and-coming 
Mookie is harangued by a local and elderly busybody. In hushed and 
conspiratorial tones, he advises Mookie to "Always do the right 
thing." The exasperated Mookie complains, "That's it? Do the right 
thing? 0.K., I got it. I'm gone . . ."1 As the film advances to its 
climactic and chaotic denouement, Mookie is forced to confront the 
  
excruciating accuracy and infuriating elusiveness of this absolutely 
trite piece of sage advice. Determined to "do the right thing," he 
acts in a way that both he and almost everyone else will forever 
question and second-guess. In this appropriately cryptic manner, 
Lee suggests the fecundity and fragility of 
political action in a postmodern world. 
Ifhis presidential address is anything to go by, Joel Handler ( 
1992) would be unimpressed by this cinematic portrayal of the 
political activist's existential predicament. Whereas Lee accepts that 
the success of political action can never be underwritten, Handler 
craves the galvanizing security of a tried-and-true program for 
progressive revitalization. Indeed, Lee seems to go further and 
contend that there is no way of knowing whether the attempt to 
"do the right thing" might turn out to be another way to "do the 
wrong thing." All strategies are hazardous and all consequences are 
unpredictable : Much will depend on the informing context and 
precise timing of any particular intervention. In a postmodern way 
of thinking and acting, there are no self-evidently correct actions or 
easy answers, but only difficult choices and questions. Those, like 
Handler, who want some theoretical assurances of progressive 
salvation before they embark on practical action are likely to be 
hamstrung by the fear of reactionary failure from taking the chance 
of transformative success. Because all options for action are 
fraught with risk, the noble dream of radical deliverance can too 
  
easily drift into the shameful sleep of comfortable quiescence. 
In this essay, I want to suggest the error of Handler's ways by 
defending postmodernism as an effective and viable theoretical 
resource in a radical project of transformative politics. Contrary to 
Handler's assertions that postmodern thinking sabotages any 
possibility of achieving a reliable program of progressive politics, I 
intend to argue that there is no necessary contradiction between a 
continuing loyalty to a postmodern perspective and the practical 
implementation of a radical political agenda (Hunt 1990; Binder 
1991). Indeed, I maintain that postmodernism is the only critical 
resource that a progressive activist can have or want. Handler's 
concerns about the indefinite intimations of a postmodern strategy 
are understandable but misplaced . While it does not provide the 
ground for a progressive politics, postmodernism does constitute a 
complementary strategy for one. The progressive postmodernist is 
neither the oxymoronic character nor the inadequate inspiration 
that Handler implies . 
Accordingly, I will engage and respond to Handler's critique at 
both the theoretical and practical level.2 In the first half of the essay, 
my purpose is to demonstrate that his plea for a "grandiose plan for 
a better society" (p. 719) cannot be sustained or answered; the 
postmodern critique has Handler's theoretical and political number . 
In the second half of the essay, I adumbrate the practical 
consequences of adopting a postmodern perspective in the activist 
  
lives of progressive lawyers. In particular, I want to utilize 
Handler's own earlier writings to contradict his claim that "it is not 
enough merely to challenge bourgeois hegemony: the Left must 
create a counter or alternative hegemony" (p. 722) and to sketch the 
possible direction of a non-hegemonic democratic politics. As such, 
my essay offers a preliminary meditation on what it might mean "to 
do the right thing" in a world in which notions of right and wrong 
are always contested and contestable. 
 
I. The Beginning of History? 
 
Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man 
(1991) has stirred up a hornets' nest of ideological controversy and 
scholarly criticism. With its vast historical sweep and philosophical 
erudition, it is political theorizing in the grand tradition. In a 
weighty volume that is not short on theoretical ambition or practical 
prediction, the former Reagonite policy analyst contends that there 
is a implicit directionality to Western history and that its inexorable 
end point is an eminently good place to arrive. Continuing where 
Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel left off and enlisting the 
interpretive ingenuity of Alexandre Kojeve and the practical vision of 
Vaclav Havel, he tries to document and defend a coherent and 
universal History of Humankind that inexorably and inevitably 
leads to liberal democracy. While it is incompletely implemented 
  
and capable of further refinement, the ideal of liberal democracy 
marks the final end of History: "the modern liberal democratic world 
. . . is free of contradictions" (p. 139) and "at the end of history, 
there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal 
democracy" (p. 211). For Fukuyama, liberal democracy is best able 
to satisfy the basic human needs of reason, desire, and self-
esteem. Moreover, contemporary events have reinforced such a 
teleological historiography and warranted the conclusion that "there 
is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary 
pattern for all human societies-in short, something like a universal 
History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy" (p. 48). 
Joel Handler would have little truck with Fukuyama's brand of 
scholarly proselytizing. He would probably and rightly condemn its 
philosophical pretension, suspect history, and ideological 
transparency. Handler is an implacable foe of what he terms "the 
ideological hegemony of liberal capitalism" (p. 727) and its racist and 
patriarchical bonds: the motive concern of his work is the need to 
provide an effective challenge to such a degrading way of living 
and a bankrupt mode of theorizing. More important, in marked 
contrast to Fukuyama, Handler would argue that liberal democracy is 
part of the problem, not a mainstay of the solution. Although liberal 
democracy has played a beneficial role in wresting people from the 
grip of medieval dogmatism, material deprivation, and the hierarchy 
of tradition, Handler would maintain that it has done so at the 
  
considerable cost of ubiquitous commodification and collective 
anomie. In ignoring the tarnished image of liberal democracy, 
Fukuyama fails to heed his own advice that "we should be careful to 
distinguish transitional conditions from permanent ones" (1991:118). 
Liberal democracy is a way station in history, not History's Final 
Destination. Accordingly, instead of working to justify the legitimacy 
of liberal democracy, Handler calls for a "global revolutionary 
critique" and "comprehensive political and economic plan" that might 
invigorate and inform the radical alternative to liberal democracy and 
its theoretical apologists (pp. 720-21, 722). 
To break the grip that liberal democracy has on the 
contemporary political imagination, Handler demands that there 
must be some strong and full-blown vision of an egalitarian 
community and non-exploitive economy. He is steadfast in his 
insistence that such a positive and "grandiose plan for a better 
society" is essential to subvert and transform the institutions of 
modern power (p. 719). Without such a wide-ranging and detailed 
blueprint, the left will concede the field to the Fukuyamas of the world 
and the future to the forces of conservative ideology. For Handler, 
the only way to meet and dislodge one vision is with another, better 
and more encompassing vision of the terms and conditions of social 
life. The blurred vision of liberal democracy must be replaced by the 
limpid clarity of an egalitarian community that can illuminate the 
path of a progressive politics: "it is not enough merely to challenge 
  
bourgeois hegemony: the Left must create a counteror alternative 
hegemony" (p. 722). 
Yet, as uncompromising as Handler's opposition would be to the 
substance of Fukuyama's work, he contrives to share the same 
apocalyptic style and methodological motivations. Rather than 
junking entirely this discredited tradition of grand theorizing and 
cast it onto the scrapheap of failed scholarship, Handler holds onto 
its broad epistemic framework and historiographic aspirations-the 
siting and substantiating of a Telos that can guide and judge 
History in its Progress. In place of Fukuyama's version of The End of 
History and the Last Man, Handler comes close to offering his own 
rendition of "The Beginning of History and the First Person." The 
main difference is that, whereas Fukuyama wants to sit back and let 
History run its course, Handler wants to give a tweak to History's 
tail and point this mythical beast in a more promising direction. 
Complain as each might, Handler and Fukuyama are members of 
the same philosophical family: Handler is the progressive sibling to 
Fukuyama's reactionary self. 
As a matter of historical record, both Fukuyama and Handler are 
on shaky ground. As much as Fukuyama would be hard-put to 
demonstrate that recent global events are necessarily attributable to 
any particular logic or pattern, Handler would be equally flummoxed by 
the task of showing that such a grand, detailed, and universalizable 
vision was a necessary precondition of revolutionary change. When 
  
people take to the streets of Johannesburg, Prague, Beijing, Moscow, 
Timisoara, Frankfurt, or Los Angeles, they are rarely motivated by any 
particular or perfected plans for social renovation. Such uprisings are 
more often sparked by some local and relatively minor act of official 
injustice or bureaucratic crassness; they tend to be instinctive, 
spontaneous, and unpredictable in their timing and intensity. Moreover, 
if the rebels are committed to act in the name of anything, it is the 
vague but noble desire for human dignity or a stark belief that "enough 
is enough." People do not give their lives for academic musings, nor 
do revolutions await the final theoretical word from the ivory tower. 
Like Lee's Mookie, they listen to the promptings of their instincts and 
try to "do the right thing." 
As a matter of intellectual endeavor, both Fukuyama and 
Handler want to rescript History by providing a grand narrative of 
historical justification and social emancipation. Where they part 
company is on the design and details of this Universal Script. In 
sharp contrast to Fukuyama's liberal democracy, Handler is dedicated 
to crafting a blueprint for an egalitarian society that can bring 
History to an end by force of its own intrinsic appeal and 
providential rightness. Inspired by such a scholarly vision, Handler 
imagines that progressive activists can enlighten a dull citizenry 
who will compliantly follow the intelligentsia into an egalitarian 
future. It is a seductive, but flawed, ambition whose elite means 
betray its democratic end. Moreover, such a hegemonic vision cannot 
  
transcend the contingent dictates of historical living. As a project of 
transformative politics, Handler's enterprise must, like Fukuyama's, 
remain unfulfilled in its theoretical aspirations and practical 
realization. 
Both Fukuyama and Handler are engaged, as Fukuyama puts it 
(1991:131), in "a Marxist interpretation of History that leads to a 
completely non-Marxist conclusion." Of course, this is the very 
admission of ideological complicity-it is the Marxist interpretation of 
history, as much as its completely non-Marxist (or Marxist) 
conclusions, that is the problem. As the epitome of scientistic 
historiography, the Marxist interpretation of history must be 
abandoned in its entirety: it does not warrant or deserve a second 
chance. The challenge is to replace this mendacious method as well 
as its dubious and self-serving outcomes with a theoretical approach 
that engenders a more democratic interpretation of history and its 
redemptive possibilities. And, contrary to Handler's jeremiad, this is 
exactly what postmodernism does. 
II. A Postmodern Vision 
 
As Handler seems unable to accept, the only available option is 
to abandon entirely the elusive search for grand narratives or 
grandiose critiques. A non-foundationalist or postmodern rendering 
of history and its political opportunities is the way to go. There is 
no one optimistic or pessimistic account of historical destiny. Most 
  
important, there is no History or Destiny. History might not be 
Shakespeare's "tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing" (Macbeth, act 5, sc. 5), but it is also not what Fukuyama 
thinks it is or what Handler wants it to be. History cannot be 
completely got out of or into: its presence is never entirely self-
present to itself so that it can be temporarily embraced or summarily 
evaded. Post-modemism does not denigrate or dismiss the value and 
truth of historical experience or human suffering-that would be 
nonsensical and unpardonable. Instead, it avoids essentializing its 
value or truth by insisting on a multiplicity of values and truths . From 
a postmodern perspective, [h]istory is both the context for and 
subject of social study and political interpretation. Historical 
experience is given relevance by interrogating it and resisting the 
temptation to reduce it to a new authoritative source of 
epistemological knowledge or ideological insight.' Pos-tmodemism is 
pluralistic, not monistic, in its operation and ambition. 
Handler's catalog of postmodern characteristics-anti-essentialism, 
social plasticity, ironic juxtapositioning, discursive subversion, 
small-scale insurgency, grass-roots organizing, strategic 
intervention, and the like-is faithful and fair. It is his anxiety and 
concern that, while understandable, is unnecessary. Influenced by 
Claus Offe and Carl Boggs, Handler laments that a postmodern 
perspective cannot deliver the political goods: it will not be able to 
confront and confound fully the oppressive workings of elite 
  
institutions. His fear is that the postmodern tum will result in left 
politics being steered down a political blind alley in which 
transformative energies will be exhausted in obsessive and 
paralyzing odysseys in self-discovery: liberal capitalism will have 
reasserted itself, courtesy of its postmodern antagonist, and bourgeois 
hegemony will persist. He is particularly troubled that, "without a 
positive theory of institutions, post-modemism cannot come to grips 
with institutionally based power" (p. 724). He holds that post-
modemism will only engender a politics of quietism and 
irresponsibility that will be long on personal angst and short on 
social solidarity. 
Contrary to Handler's pessimism, post-modemism offers all the 
political firepower that he can have or want : it can galvanize individual 
agency and generate collective engagement. If any theorizing is 
likely to lead to political paralysis, it is Handler's. He makes the 
common and unnecessary mistake of concluding that 
postmodernism's eschewal of any universal, essential, or ahistorical 
ground on which to build or anchor any claim of epistemic 
justification signals the end of the theoretical enterprise entirely. 
This is a profound error. It is not that the theoretical enterprise 
must be abandoned or, in particular, that political critique must be 
forsaken: it is the nature and status of such work that must be 
reappraised. While postmodernism rejects the metaphysical 
privileging of grand theory, it most certainly does not deny the 
  
worth of social, historical or political theorizing. Provided that it is 
suitably provisional, revisable, and contextual, such theorizing is at 
the heart of a transformative political praxis. In rejecting History, it 
does not ignore the lessons of history, and in rejecting Telos, it 
does not eschew the value of criticism. As all claims are located 
within a dynamic set of social practices, postmodernism insists that 
all theorizing pay attention to the structural circumstances of that 
social milieu and, in particular, to theorizing its own embeddedness 
in such historical contexts. Critical insight is a prelude to 
transformative action. 
Accordingly, any theoretically sophisticated or satisfactory 
account of politics must grapple with the extant protocols of power 
and, in making any proposal for transformative change, must 
recognize its own revisable and experimental character. Exemplified 
in the radical work of Cornel West, a postmodern politics of radical 
democracy "promotes a critical temper and democratic faith without 
making criticism a fetish or democracy an idol" (West 1991:124-25; 
see also West 1988, 1989). By moving beyond the debilitating 
politics of abstraction and ahistoricality, postmodernism looks to 
create personal meaning and social knowledge in the situated 
particulars of embedded experience. The ambition is not to fix an 
all-encompassing Truth or Justice in a distant metaphysical realm, but 
to pay constant attention to the multiple truths and contextual 
details of engaged living (Harris 1990; Radin 1990). Of course, 
  
being political, that process will always be open and fluid; meaning 
will always be provisional and revisable. Moreover, by using rich 
accounts and critical readings of historical experience to promote 
political knowledge and action, that politics will always be 
contestable: politics itself can never be a privileged ground for 
anything. 
Understood in this way, postmodernism does not provide an 
integrated or finished program for political action. In the face of 
the problematized agent, postmodernism does not capitulate or 
retreat from the task of struggling toward an enhanced social 
solidarity and experience of justice. Instead, it points to a renewed 
engagement and sustained challenge to existing historical conditions. 
By abandoning the search to recover or fix a unified and pristine 
self, the hope is to empower subjects by making them individually 
aware of their capacity for self-(re)creation and their collective 
responsibility for establishing a mode of social life that multiplies 
the opportunities for transformative action. Postmodernism 
problematizes truth, individuals, agency, and collective action not 
to discard them from the radical vocabulary of progressive politics 
but to render them more immediately transformable and more 
politically useful. The tendency of Handler's critique is to reduce 
people to walk-on parts in an unfolding drama rather than expect 
them to be active citizens in their own struggle to define and achieve 
emancipation. 
  
Handler is right in thinking that postmodernism cannot guarantee 
a politics that will be uniformly progressive or whose practice will be 
consistently effective. But to think otherwise is to believe that the 
establishment of foundational truths is possible and could ground a 
radical political praxis. The felt need that people have for such solid 
ground under their metaphysical feet is an effect of traditional 
metaphysics's mistaken insistence that, once fixed, Truth or History 
will guide and insulate action from error. It is a mistake that Handler 
repeats and further entrenches. Disabused of such foundationalist 
yearnings, people will begin to understand that politics is inside, not 
outside, History's suzerainty. A program of progressive politics must 
constantly be negotiated and renegotiated. Consequently, while 
postmodernism implies a progressive politics, it does not necessarily 
lead to one. What is progressive can never be determined in advance 
or in the abstract; such assessment can only be made with an 
attention to the local conditions and the prevailing exigencies of the 
situation. Postmodernism can open spaces for action and increase 
opportunities for transformation, but it cannot fill these spaces. 
Whether these openings become holes to fall down or climb out 
of is left to those minded to act. Citizenship in a postmodern 
polity is not a received status but is a continuing responsibility to 
make the best of the situation for oneself and others. 
All that a postmodern mentality can do is to show that power is 
never apart from reason: Logic and ambiguity, authority and 
  
arbitrariness, and universality and contingency are implicated in each 
other. Leaving the risks and responsibility of reconstruction with real 
people in real situations, what is democratic or good politics will 
always remain contestable. There is no guarantee against tyranny-
nothing can deliver us from that. Postmodernists remind us (and 
themselves must not forget) that while there must be talk of a dawn of 
egalitarianism, there are many who still live in the dusk of oppression 
(see Gates 1990:1289). No theoretical standpoint alone can ensure 
that the long night's journey into light can be accomplished without 
struggle, mistakes, and further pain. The challenge and trick for 
postmodernists is to nurture and develop those talents and 
sensibilities that will attune them better to the nuances and 
vulnerabilities of structural settings and local contexts. Ironically, it 
is to this very task that Handler makes his most telling and 
enduring contributions. 
 
III. Handler Revealed 
This means that, notwithstanding his reservations and concerns, 
Handler will have lost nothing and gained much by ditching his 
foundationalist suppositions and shifting to a thoroughly postmodern 
style of critical enquiry. He will no longer have to toil in the same 
methodological fields as Fukuyama and his cronies. He will be free to 
pursue new pastures and feed his political imagination on fresh 
  
historical shoots. At the cost of abandoning the false lure of 
universal panaceas, he will have acquired the substantial merit of 
political relevance. He can continue to reap the fruits of socialist 
thinking, but he must cultivate a more diverse crop. As Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985:178) put it, "every project for radical democracy 
implies a socialist dimension, . . . but socialism is but one of the 
components of a project of radical democracy, not vice versa." 
Socialism neither exhausts democracy by becoming its total platform 
nor is it to be expunged from the radical agenda entirely. In short, 
Handler can have my postmodernism and his socialism too. 
Relieved of the anxiety to craft solutions that are somehow apt for all 
times and places, he can concentrate on the pressing problems of 
contemporary American society and experiment with interventions 
that can best address the prevailing institutional structures of power. 
So informed, Handler can rest assured that "postmodernism politics 
[can be] a reliable guide for transformative politics" (p. 723). 
For all Handler's championing of the social movements of the 
1960s and 1970s, based on "solidarity and struggle with an optimism 
reflecting the dreams of that era" (p. 715), these initiatives flattered 
to deceive. Such struggle achieved only modest success and, like the 
optimism of their informing dreams, tended to flounder in the face of 
the waking reality of a recalcitrant social life. As regards the use of 
rights litigation, there is very little empirical support for the 
extravagant and imperialistic claims that are often made about the 
  
efficacy of courts as fora for social change. In the most 
comprehensive and exhaustive survey of the field, Gerald Rosenberg 
is firmly of the opinion that "courts can almost never be effective 
producers of significant social change" (1991:338). Indeed, in his 
earlier work, Handler himself came to the assessment that the best 
that can be expected from judicial institutions is that their effects on 
social behavior and attitudes will be "incremental, gradualist, and 
moderate" (1978:238).4 The upshot is that there is little choice but to 
engage in the postmodern struggles of local skirmishes. To do less is 
to lapse into a torpid acquiescence in the status quo; to do more is 
to ferment the violent disruption of full-scale revolution. 
Almost the best example of a scholarly endeavor in practical 
criticism that resonates with a postmodern accent is an earlier effort 
by Handler himself. His widely and justly acclaimed The Conditions 
of Discretion ( 1986) is devoted to examining and transforming the 
frustrating interaction between ordinary people and large-scale 
bureaucracy. Focusing on programs for the special educational needs 
of differently abled children, Handler not surprisingly rejects the 
traditional resort to indeterminate systems of rights and adversarial 
procedural remedies. Seeing them as legalistic trappings of liberal 
democracy, he contests their historical success and ideological 
merit. Rights talk has not only failed as a matter of history to deliver 
the progressive goods, but its individualistic vision of the good life 
is deeply flawed and ignores the socially pervasive and institutionally 
  
systemic nature of oppression. The resort to rights litigation as a 
schematic process for substantial social renovation is a fundamental 
error and a tactical mistake. For Handler, the very reasons that gave 
rise to liberalism's original appeal have become the source of its 
contemporary failing as a program for progressive change-its 
universalistic pretensions, unyielding individualism, and pervasive 
ahistoricality. 
The whole force and ambition of Handler's project is to replace 
the formal and abstract logic of rights litigation with situation-specific 
solutions that are discretionary, local, contingent, experimental, and 
flexible. In a richly textured and compelling narrative, he articulates 
the need to nurture a nuanced and revisable power-sharing 
engagement between parents and administrators that mediates and 
responds to the interaction of larger structural forces and more local 
openings for transformative action. Handler's analytical critique 
and reconstructive proposals are the very pith and substance of a 
postmodern perspective and politics: 
The Madison [Wisconsin] system grew out of its own traditions 
and particular circumstances. This is not to say that it was 
impervious to the world . . . . Nevertheless, within [various legal, 
political, social and structural] constraints and influences, there is 
room to maneuver, to develop and modify styles and patterns of 
operation, to create and emphasize certain programs . . . . Thus, in 
considering the possibilities of organizational response, one must 
be aware of both contingency and change. Today's solutions will 
  
not necessarily be recognizable tomorrow. . . . If we are to take the 
idea of discretion seriously, then each community must work toward 
the conditions of discretion in its own way according to its own 
particular circumstances. Policy, agencies, social groups, and 
individuals are fluid and subject to constant change. If we are to take 
individualism seriously, then we must live with uncertainty. 
(Handler 1986:10, 12, 15) 
As such, Handler's performance strikes all the right chords in the 
postmodern register. Abandoning the overweening rhetoric of rights, he 
concedes that "there are no fixed principles that chart a clear path; 
[t]here are no laws of nature that will regulate our lives as we wish to 
lead them; [t]here are no simple truths that will explain the disorders 
and complexities of life" (ibid., pp. 303-4). Instead, he stresses the 
inevitable struggle with a fluid context of social indeterminacy and 
extols the virtues of a revisable politics that mediates the micro and 
macro functionings of power. By so doing, he is able to generate a 
malleable framework of understanding and empowerment that can be 
reworked for other and different settings. All in all, Handler's work is 
thoroughly postmodern in style and effect. Little did he know that, like 
Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain, he has long been a postmodernist without 
recognizing it (Moliere, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, act 2, sc. 4). 
For instance, even though Handler's presidential address is 
dismissive of Lucie White's (1990) work on welfare recipients, her 
work tracks and develops many of the themes that are sketched in 
Handler's Conditions of Discretion. While expressed in a more self-
  
consciously postmodern accent, White utilizes the same analytical tools 
and activist tactics as Handler-local resistance, contextual contestation 
and contingent change (Handler, pp. 712-13). It is true that White's 
selected engagement between a welfare recipient and the state 
bureaucracy did not, as an inspired Handler might wish, "smash this 
sorry state of things entire and rebuild it closer to the heart's desire." 
However, the outcome was not, as Handler said of other postmodern 
initiatives, "trivial and without political significance" (Handler, p. 714). 
It affected a few individual lives for the better in a tangible and 
immediate way that ought not to be underestimated. Of course, such 
parochial activism can fuel the centrifugal tendencies to fragmentation, 
isolation, and ephemerality. But while such engagement can detract 
from the nurturing of organizational solidarity and social alliances, 
they can also instill a hopeful sense of transformative potential for 
broader social renovation. Like charity, the best and only effective 
place to begin to change things is in the homely locations of where 
we live, work, and play. 
As Handler implicitly accepted in Conditions of Discretion, but seems 
to reject explicitly now, the postmodern challenge is to move beyond 
the political stereotyping of traditional ideologies, the false lure of 
grand theorizing and one-dimensional narratives for transformative 
action. For instance, the choice is not between a wholesale adoption 
or outright rejection of rights talk as a vehicle for progressive change: 
the categoric denial of rights talk is almost as bad as its categoric 
  
embrace. The fragmented and diverse terrain of modern society 
cannot be effectively mapped by traditional leftist or liberal 
interpretations, nor can such theoretical projections provide a viable 
or effective plan of transformative action. In the same way that it is 
no longer possible to invoke "material interests" or "class analysis" 
as a decisive ploy in political argument, foreswearing engagement in 
any rights litigation at all is not a realistic or responsible tactic (see 
Hall & Jacques 1989). Moreover , the answer is not, as some 
scholars seem to think, to rejig liberal rights talk in line with a more 
postmodern and progressive approach. They maintain that by junking 
the notion of rights as a set of fixed and abstract claims, this 
approach will revalorize the notion as a conversational discourse 
through which to establish a progressive community in the struggle 
for meaning (see Minow 1990; Trakman 1991). The problem with 
such efforts is that they are cosmetic in character and remain 
foundationalist in orientation. They graft the insights of 
postmodernism onto a traditional version of rights talk but fail to 
change or disturb its basic workings and strategies. As such, they 
merely give the villain of the piece a fresh change of rhetorical threads 
and make too good a job of a democratic bad lot (see Hutchinson 
1989:563, 1991, 1992). 
Like the abstract instincts of liberalism and rights talk, the 
politics of class struggle can fail to respect sufficiently differences 
of race and gender in its totalizing march to social justice. Of 
  
course, there is no need to abandon efforts to understand the ways 
in which power and truth remain centralized and congealed with 
structures of material interests. While it is naive to suggest that 
relations of domination are not inscribed within material practices, it 
is equally troubling to insist that all forms of domination are entirely 
reducible to class conflict. Totalizing politics are unrealistic and 
unrealizable . Grass-roots engagement is better able to grasp and 
transform the complex and diverse intersecting forms of oppression. 
Sexism and racism might be global in existence and sweep, but 
their dynamism is local in operation and effect. Oppression is 
universal, but its modalities are particular . 
Postmodern lawyers and their clients must studiously ensure 
that they do not become only actors in others' stultifying scripts of 
social enlightenment and political empowerment. There is no one 
true story to tell or enact, all claims to knowledge must be tentative 
and provisional, and the sites for transformative advocacy must 
remain multiple and dynamic. Under a postmodern attachment, the 
details and priorities of an activist program must be the 
continuing subject of healthy debate, respectful disagreement, and 
continual reappraisal. To "do the right thing" is a fluctuating and 
unfinished duty that is always fraught with risk: it is not a blanket 
willingness (or refusal) to "do the rights thing." Rejecting 
comprehensive programs and universal positions, the postmodern 
lawyer must attend to the local circumstances of disputes, to the 
  
situated places in which people exist, and the contingent 
possibilities for action. At the heart of their professional existence 
is the acute responsibility to tum the unavoidable occasions of 
resistance into meaningful moments of transformation, not invidious 
instances of subtle complicity or lost opportunities of misjudged 
insurrection. It is exactly this challenge that the best of Handler's 
work is devoted to meeting. 
 
IV. Dancing at the Edge 
 
A few years ago, I published a collection of essays. Although it 
was not intended or presented as a postmodern perspective on law 
and politics, hindsight obliges me to recognize that its contents and 
style did represent some faltering and ingenuous steps toward such a 
theoretical platform. My recent work has been more openly and self-
consciously postmodern in origin and ambition. The title of my 
collection was Dwelling on the Threshold (1989), and a central motif 
of the work was the need to stake out a narrow and precarious 
ledge of criticism that ran "the considerable risk of succumbing to 
the secure comforts of traditional jurisprudence or straying too far 
into the wilderness of political irrelevance" (p. viii). It was this 
theoretical mind set and political location that gave-and obviously 
continues to give-Joel Handler serious concern. Indeed, he is 
adamant that such an approach to legal theorizing and political 
  
advocacy is intellectually mistaken and ideologically disastrous: 
It seems to me that if postmodernism is to seriously challenge the 
ideological hegemony of liberal capitalism, it must come with an 
alternative vision, a vision of the economy and of the polity that will 
complement its vision of community. Allan Hutchinson calls his 
postmodern book, Dwelling on the Threshold. That concedes the field. 
(Handler, p. 727) 
In this essay, I have tried to show that, far from conceding the 
field, this is the best way that those committed to progressive change 
can occupy the field and begin to challenge "the ideological 
hegemony of liberal capitalism." If more vision is what Handler 
wants and thinks is needed, he can rest assured that there is nothing 
in postmodemism that prevents the exercise of visionary faculties. 
Indeed, it allows such reconstructive insights to take flight; it is 
traditional theorizing that clips the wings of the political imagination 
in the service of a hegemonic projection. Nevertheless, the pursuit of 
one "alternative vision of economy and community" is resisted by 
postmodernism. In line with its democratic and pluralistic instincts, it 
rejects a belief in any single or accurate vision of community or social 
justice; a deconstructive critique must not be allowed to become the 
last refuge of an foundationalist scoundrel. There is no place for 
an enforced orthodoxy or rigid conformity, for "ajust society is not a 
society that has adopted just laws, once and for all, rather it is a 
society where the question of justice remains constantly open" 
(Castoriadis 1980:104). Rejecting comprehensive programs and 
  
universal positions, the postmodern critic must attend to local and 
contingent circumstances of claims to knowledge and to the situated 
places from which people speak and act. 
Those, like Handler, who are committed to progressive action in 
a postmodern world must resist the temptation to seek theoretical 
closure and enforce practical dogma. They must decline the familiar 
litany of easy answers in favor of a more challenging slate of better 
and different questions. Closure is always contrived, often 
arbitrary, and usually conducive to established power relations. 
Obsessed with elucidating right and final answers, progressive 
scholars often forget that the agenda of questions to be answered 
is constantly changing. Within the traditional and non-postmodern 
mode of political theorizing, justice becomes a matter of revelation 
and progress comprises a slow march to a promised land that is 
always and elusively around the next historical bend. In a 
postmodern world, living is more immediate and engaged. It is a 
dangerous dance in which there is never one right thing to do but 
only fleeting occasions to try to "do the right thing." 
To make a new world you have to start with an old one, certainly. 
To find a world, maybe you have to have lost one. Maybe you have 
to be lost. The dance of renewal, the dance that made the world, was 
always danced here at the edge of things, on the brink, on the 
foggy coast. (Le Guin 1989:48) 
 
 
  
Notes 
Many thanks to Harry Glasbeek, Pam Carpenter, Brenda Cossman, Lynda Covello, and Rose 
Della  Rocca for comments  and  support. 
I Lee 1989. Like all Lee's films, Do The Right Thing is controversial in society at large and 
within the African-American community. In particular, it has been strongly criticized for its 
depiction of black sexuality. See Wallace 1990:100-110; hooks 1992:75 
& 102. 
2 I have already addressed some of these issues at length in earlier pieces . See 
Hutchinson 1991, 1992. 
3   See Matsuda  1987:325 & 324. In her more recent work (1990), Matsuda seems to have 
put any essentialism behind her. 
4   On new social movements-women, gays, etc.-see Epstein 1990. 
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